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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
LEON PETERSON,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
GEORGE TURNER, an individual,
and SPRAY TEXTURE AND
DRY ALL SYSTElVlS, INC., a
corporation,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No.
12633

Respondent's Brief On Appeal
STATE1V1ENT OF NATURE O:F' CASE
Respondent, Leon Peterson, alleged a breach of
contract by George Turner, an individual, and by Spray
Texture and Drywall Systems, Inc., a corporation, the
appellant herein. The case was tried in the District
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, before the
Honorable Merrill C. Faux, District Judge, sitting
without a jury.
Damages were awarded to the respondent, Leon
Peterson, against appellant, Spray Texture and Drywall Systems, Inc., a corporation, in accordance with
the prayer of the complaint; and respondent's claim
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against George Turner, an individual, was dismissed
as No Cause Of' Action.
DISPOSITION IN TI-IE LOWER COURT
Judgment was entered by the Honorable Merrill
C. Faux, and appellant Spray Texture and Drywall
Systems, Inc., a corporation, has undertaken this appeal
to the Supreme Court Of The State Of Utah. The
Judgment was in the sum of $3,339.00 with interest
thereon from January 15, 1970, at the rate of 6% per
annum, together with costs in the sum of $26.80.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the Judgment
entered by the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant is a corporation engaged in the business
of a drywall installation contractor. Respondent is an
individual engaged in the real estate business as a de·
veloper.
Appellant and respondent first became aware of
each other in July, 1969, at which time respondent was
in the process of constructing a 16 unit apartment com·
plex at 130 South 8th East, Salt Lake City, Utah.
On July 22, 1969, upon a form which it uses in its
business and which appears in the record of this case

R

as Pia ·ntiff's Exhibit 1 and Defendant's
.. Exhibit 6-D '
appellant proposed to furnish all materials and labor
necessary for the sheetrocking of respondent's 16 unit
apartment complex at a price of $9,461.00.
Appellant did not in fact furnish the material and
labor necessary for the sheetrocking of respondent's 16
unit apartment complex. Respondent obtained the materials and labor necessary for the sheetrocking of his
apiirtment complex from another contractor at a cost
of
Respondent cla;ms that a contract resulted when
he accepted appellant's proposal in writing and orally
through a telephone conversation with George Turner,
one of the principals of appellant company.
Appellant contends that no contract ever came into
existence between appellant and respondent for the
reason that appellant's proposal was never accepted by
respondent.
For breach of the alleged contract with appellant,
the respondent claims damages for loss of rental income
for one month and for the excess paid to another contractor over and above appellant's offer for doing the
work and supplying the mater:als for respondent's
<1partment complex.
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ARGUl\iENT
POINT I

THE FINDING OF A CONTRACT BK
TWEEN THE PARTIES BY THE TRIAl
COURT WAS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

The real question before the Court is whether 01
not there was in fact a contract between the parties. A
contract consists of both an offer and an acceptance.
The appellant admits in the pleadings (Def. Answer,
para. 2) that "on or about July 22, 1969, a certain Pro·
posal and Contract (Pl. Ex. 1) was executed by de·
f endant (appellant) for contracting work in the amoun1
of $9,461.00."

The Court found that respondent accepted this of·
fer based upon the following evidence:
Respondent accepted the offer by "writing on
a piece of paper to Mr. George Turner, the fact that
' the offer was accepted on my part, and that it would be
up to him to see how the job progressed, and for hirn
·to come in and complete his work, as specified in the
offer." (R. 30:24-27, 47:17-23):
I.

2. This "piece of paper" was sent "by mail" (R
30 :30, 31 :2, 46: 18) on "July 25th, 26th or 27th"
(R. 31:22, 46:12). It was sent by "regular mail" (R
46 :22) in that respondent delivered it to an agent of the
United States Government (R. 81 :27-30, 49 :1-2, 6) ·
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3. The letter was addressed to "Spray Texture
Drywall Systems, Inc.", ( R. 46 :26, 48 :24) . Respondent
did not recall the exact address (R. 46:26-271 54:10-11).
The only address for Spray Texture Drywall Systems,
Inc. available to respondent was "3489 South 1400
West, Salt Lake City, Utah" (R. 53:27) which was on
the Proposal and Contract (Pl. Ex. 1) or that which
appeared in the "telephone book" ( R. 46 :30) . There
was no evidence that the address in the telephone book
was any different than that which appeared on the appellant's offer (Pl. Ex. 1).
4. The envelope in which the letter of acceptance
was mailed had the return address of the respondent
on it (R. 47:11-15). There was no evidence that the letter was ever returned.
The contract was completed at the moment the
respondent delivered to the agent of the United States
Government the envelope, properly addressed to the ,
appellant, which contained the piece of paper accepting I
the offer. "\Villiston, Contracts 3rd Ed. §§ 81, 83, 85;]
Restatement, Contracts, § 67.
In support of the Court's finding that respondent's
offer had been communicated to and received by appellant and that he was aware of respondent's acceptance
and that the job was his, is the following evidence:
On July 29th (R. 32:12, 50:6) the respondent
"talked to Mr. Turner on the phone and told him I
would be out of town for a period of two or three weeks,
and wanted to, again, let him know, if there was any- :
1.

1
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thing I could do to expedite things; and would he complete the job, so he could do his work, again, as
specified in the offer." (R. 31 :9-14). "I was reiterating
acceptance of his offer." (R. 50:19-20).
2. One evening between August 15 and August
30 ( R. 32 :16) , respondent "met Mr. Turner (a ppel·
lant) on the job, ... and he (Turner) was checking
on it, seeing how things (were) progressing, getting
ready to move the crews and order the material-things
of that nature. The extent of our conversation, at that
fme, was, the material would be delivered in a couple of
days to the job, and work would progress." (R. 51 :22·
28, 33 :1-4).
In support of the Court's finding that appellant,
through acceptance of other outstanding bids, had an
unusually heavy work load at the time he was to per·
form the contract accepted by respondent and thus, de·
nied that said contract had ever been accepted, is the
fallowing evidence:
Sometime dur;ng August, appellant, who had
a work force of 15 to 25 men at that time (R. 77:6),
received an acceptance of an outstanding bid for The
Willows (R. 75 :11-12) which called for construction
of 120 units (R. 78:13-14).1\ir. Turner testified that
he could have used all his men for work at The Willows
(R. 77:11). In addition, sometime in September, appellant received an acceptance of an outstanding bid for
Award Homes (R. 75 :14-30) which called for construction of 64 units (R. 78:15-16). 1\fr. Turner testi1.
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fied that he could have used half of his men for work
on Award Homes.
2.
Turner testified that other projects including Layton (R. 74:25) and Diagonal in Murray (R.
74 :25) came in other than The Willows and Award
Homes during August and September ( R. 76 :20-21),
all of which was after appellant had made its offer to
do respondent's work (Tr. 74:28-30). Mr. Turner testified that August was an "unusually heavy month in
terms of bids receiving acceptance." ( R. 76: 17-29). He
(Turner) also testified that "when we signed the contract on both of those jobs (The 'Villows-120 units
and Award Homes-64 units), we knew we couldn't
handle those jobs (184) units and his (respondent's)
job ( 16 units), too. (R. 79 :16-18) (R. 29 :12, 48.3,
78:17-18).
3. The offer to perform the work for respondent's
job (16 units) which was made on July 22, 1969 (Pl.
Ex. 1), was still outstanding at the time appellant took
on all this additional work in August and September.
Respondent admitted that he had never withdrawn the
offer (R. 77 :18-30, 78 :1-11).
4. During the latter part of August or :first part
of September (R. 33:18-19, 51 :17-20), respondent
called :Mr. Turner on the telephone and said he had
heard he (Turner) would not be in to do the drywall
work because he (Turner) had too much other work
(Tr. 33:30, 34:1, 52:2-3.
Turner testified that respondent told him that the "job was ready to sheetrock,
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and he (respondent) would like us (appellant) on
job within the week . . . . He (respondent) just said
the building was ready and the bid looked good, and he
(respondent) would like us (appellant) to do it." Mr.
Turner testified that he told respondent that he "didn't
think (he) could handle the job, now, that (he) hadn't
been notified (his) bid had been accepted; (he) had
accepted other work, and (he) couldn't perform on the
job, now." (R. 71-16-29). Mr. Turner did say, how·
ever, that this conversation took place at the end of
September (R. 71 :15, 77:28-29). If, for sake of argu·
ment, there had been no acceptance of an outstanding
offer prior to this telephone conversation, appellant
admitted there was in fact an acceptance at this time.
The appellant simply told the respondent that "we ac·
cepted these other jobs, and when Mr. Peterson called,
we knew we were at our limit as far as capacity on work
we could handle; and I indicated that to him, at that
time." (R. 79:9-12).
Based on the above, there is sufficient evidence to
show that appellant's offer was accepted in writing, that
it was confirmed by subsequent telephone conversation
and further by the subsequent acts and conduct of ap·
pellant in going onto the construction site and discussing
with the respondent when he would start work on the
project.
While the offer provided that all agreements should
be in writing, the statute of frauds does not require a
writing for such a contract to be binding. 25-5-1 et. seq.
F. C. A. 1953, as amended.

Generally, where a contract is not required (by
law) to be in writing, mutual assent or meeting of the
minds may be proved by words spoken as well as by acts
and conduct. Thorton v. Pasch, 104 Utah 313, 139 P. 2d
1002 (1943), followed in Radley v. Smith, 6 Utah 2d
314, 313 P. 2d 465 ( 1957).
In considering the facts of Thorton v. Pasch,
supra, wherein the offer to furnish labor and equipment was signed by one party (the party who was to
do the work), the party signing told the other when he
would be in to do the work, and the other party never
intimated that he had not accepted the offer, the court
concluded that whether or not a contract did exist was
for the jury.
Since no jury was requested in the case at bar, the
decision as to whether or not the appellant's offer was
ever accepted was for the Court. The Utah Supreme
Court has ruled many times that the reviewing court
should give deference to the advantaged position and
prerogatives of the trial judge as the finder of facts
and allow him considerable latitude of discretion as to
orders made, and not upset his judgment and substitute
its own unless it clearly appears that he abused his perrogatives. Erickson v. Beardall, 20 Utah 2d 287, 437
P.2d210 (1968).
The trial judge ably noted the following: "The
evidence given by Mr. Turner related to, in all instances,
the men with whom he was regularly doing work. This
was the first business contact between these two people.
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Peterson wasn't acquainted with his course of doing
business-first, sending out a single copy of a proposal
and waiting for an acceptance, and then part going and
getting the owner to sign it, he didn't explain to him.
He testified about doing business with people that he
did business with all the time, and all they had to do was
submit an offer. They would call him on the telephone,
say 'go ahead,' and he would go ahead; but this proposal that he said, all agreements must be made in writing. That is what he said to l\1r. Peterson, all agreements
must be made in writing. So, l\fr. Peterson sent him a
note in writing, and, within the month, talked to him on
the phone. By that time, l\Ir. Turner was taking on tremendous jobs. vVhy didn't he tell him, then, 'I can't
take your work; I just got 120 units with Willows;
don't figure on me.' But they talked about details, and
he didn't withdraw his offer, although he was loading
up on jobs; and, with 184 units, a 16-unit job was just
a drop in the bucket-" ( R. 82 :28-30, 88: 1-14). This
conclusion was based in part upon l\1r. Turner's testimony wherein he stated the fallowing: "';\Te will submit a b;d to one of our builders that we are doing work
with, and-and, with our people building homes, they
will just call us on the phone, say, 'We have got a house
at such-and-such address; go over measure it up.' We
would go measure it up; 'It wiII be X-amount of dollars,' and he said, 'Go do this.' There is never a written
contract." ( R. 80 :20-26).
llased upon the above. it is respectfully submitted
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that there was, as the trial court concluded, a contract
between the parties.
POINT II
THE A\VARDING OF DAMAGE FOR
LOSS OF RENTAL \VAS SUPPORTED BY
THE EVIDENCE.
The trial court's award of one month's loss of
rental was based upon the following evidence:
Respondent testified that Don Sudbury, who
did the drywall work when appellant abandoned the
contract, "delivered the material to the job about October 4, 1969" (R. 34:18-22).
1.

Adrian Austin confirmed that "the material\
was brought on the job on October 4, 1969" (R. 57:2, !
2.

59 :29-30, 60 :1-11).

Respondent testified that Sudbury "commenced work sometime in the middle of October" (R.
3.

35:8-10).

Respondent testified that he could not say for
sure that the building was ready for appellant to commence work "sometime around the first of September"
4.

(R. 35 :11-16, 48 :10-19).

Adrian Austin testified that the building was
ready for appellant to commence work "around Septem-J
5.

ber 15" ( R. 56 :6-9).

.

-

, <)

6. The testimony is harmonious that the building
was ready for appellant to commence work around
September 15 and yet work was not commenced by appellant's substitute, l\'Ir. Sudbury, until the "middle of
October," even though the material was delivered October 4. Thus, there was a one month delay caused by
appellant's abandonment of the contract.
7. Adrian Austin testified that the verbal framing inspection on the first floor was made approximately "somewhere between the 10th and 15th of September"
( R. 58 :21-26). Thus, the drywall work to be done by
the appellant, at least on the first floor, could have
commenced September 15, which is exactly when Adrian
Austin testified the building was ready for the same.
8. Appellant argues that since appellant told respondent, by telephone, that he was not going to do
the job in the "latter part of August" (R. 33 :16-30,
34:1-7) that respondent had two weeks to find another
contractor to do the drywall work. While th;s is true,
the evidence is that respondent used due diligence in
seeking to find another contractor. Respondent testified
that "at that time (that is, when he found out appellant
was not going to do the work) we (he and his foreman)
started looking around for someone else to come in and
do that work. This particular time of the year, it was
pretty busy. We talked to a couple of drywallers'; they
were unable to come. Then we did talk to one, Don Sudbury, who came over a short time later and looked at the
job; and we received a bid on that job; and he proceeded

upon that work. Material was delivered on the job about
October 4" (R. 34:14-22). Sudbury commenced work
around the "middle of October" (R. 35 :8-10).
Respondent testified that it took Sudbury
"approximately a month" to complete the job (R.
35 :20-22) . Respondent further testified, "based on his
experience of building five or six comparable units, that \
the drywall work on each one has taken about the same '
period of time - approximately one month from the
time the drywall contractor came on the job until the
time it was completed" (R. 37:25-30, 38:1-2).
)
9.

1

Respondent testified that because of appellant's abandonment and breach of the contract, the project was delayed one month, that the units became available for rent about the middle of December (R. 36:4-5),
that the project had 16 units, 7 one-bedroom and 9 twobedroom (R. 36:18-19), that the one bedrooms rented
for $125.00-$130.00 and the two-bedrooms rented for
$150.00-$175.00 (It. 36 :12-14), that all the units were
rented "as quickly as they were available" (R. 36:10-11,
53:8-19), and that because of appellant's breach of contract which caused the one month delay, respondent
testified that he lost one month's rental or $2,400.00
(R. 39 :47-7). However, respondent only asked
$1,200.00 for loss of rentals in his complaint and was
thus only granted $1,200.00 by the Court in its Judgment for such loss of rentals.
10.

In addition to the $1,200.00 loss of rental awarded
by the Court, it also awarded $2,139.00 which represent-
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ed the difference between the amount paid to Don Sudbury in the sum of $I I,600.00 and the amount of ap·
pellant's bid in the sum of $9,46I.00. Both respondent
and Adrian Austin testified that Don Sudbury did the
same of comparable work on the project that was to
have been performed by appellant pursuant to its offer
and bid ( R. 44 :28-30, 45 :I- I I, 55 :25-30, 56: 1) .
CONCLUSION
The Judgment of the trial court should be af·
firmed.
Respectfully submitted,
STEPHEN G. MORGAN
Morgan, Scalley, Lunt &
Kesler

Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Respondent

